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Manuscript 
prepared for presentation at the 
Temple Conference on Discourse Analysis, 
March 16-18, HershεyHotε1， PhiladεIphia， 
On Reflexivity in Human Communication 
By 
Klaus Krippendorff 
The Annenbεrg School for Communication 
University ofPennsylvania 
On Reflexivitv in Human communication 
My assignment is to talk about reflexivity , reflexivity 
in human communication (as if there were reflexivity in non-
human or technical communication). But in view of the 
limited time available here and the emotionally involving 
and intellectually puzzling film we have just seen , I shall 
limit my contribution t。
(a) a brief typology of reflexivity , 
(b) an effort to wave the concepts into a 
constructivist perspective on communication (theory) , 
and hope to offer inbetween 
(c) a few comments on the film we saw. 
A brief tVDoloov of reflexivitv 
Webster defines reflexivity as something that "directs 
。r turns back upon itself ," as in "he perjured himself ," 
l 
"she knows herself ," "they kill themselves." Naturally , 
examples of reflexivity are given in language and one might 
be led to believe , as Bertrand Russel did , that reflexivity 
is a problem of logic , or as grammarians think , a problem of 
linguistic forms. If either of this were to be the case , it 
would be easy for discourse analysts to describe the 
phenomenon and study its implications. Let me start out by 
teasing out logical and grammatical approaches t。
reflexivity and come to a more cognitive account that might 
underlay the intellectually interesting parts of both. 
L으g후드르l!:eflexìvìty. Many textbooks ìn logìc defìne a 
reflexìve relatìon as a bìnary relatìon R for whìch ìt must 
be true that 
xRy ìmplìes xRx and yRy , 
that ìs , a relatìon whose arguments must be capable of 
havìng thìs relatìon to themselves. 80 , "marrìed" ìs not 
reflexìve because neìther partner to a marrìage can be 
marrìed to hìm or herself. "Touches" ìs not reflexìve 
because , whereas someone could touch hìmself , he or she can 
touch a lot of objects that cannot. "1s not taller than" ìs 
reflexìve because when two objects ’ heìghts are compared , 
each ìs as tall as ìt ìs and never taller than ìtself. 
My problem wìth the logìcal defìnìtìon ìs that , 
whenever ìts strìct reflexìvìty crìterìon ìs met , 
reflexìvìty turns out to be unìnterestìng and , where 
reflexìvìty seems unsettlìng , paradoxìcal and worthy of 
attentìon , the logìcal crìterìon turns out to be only 
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superfìcìally applìcable. For example , the reflexìve 
relatìons "communìcates wìth" "ìs comparable to" and "ìs ìn 
the same contaìner as" are true for any paìr of objects that 
can talk and lìsten (and hence lìsten to theìr own talk) , 
share some dìmensìons (and all when compared wìth 
themselves) and fìt ìn any vessel , respectìvely. At the 
same time , while the relation "deceives" is said to be 
reflexive because people who can deceive other people are 
also presumed able to deceìve themselves , on close analysis , 
the deceiver and the deceived may not be quite the same for 
the former knows the truth he or she seeks to hide from the 
latter , the latter does not and it is far from clear 
logically how one individual can both know and not know or 
be aware and unaware of the alleged deception (Champlin , 
1988). A strict application of logical reflexivity excludes 
paradoxes. 
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Grammatical reflexivity. The grammatical forms through 
which logical reflexivity relations (xRx) become what they 
are have additional problems. "He perjured himself ," for 
example , has the same from as "he killed himself , 11 "he 
appointed himself president ," etc. , but perjury means 
telling a lie under oath and "he perjured himself" is the 
same as saying "he lied under oath" which does no longer 
appear to be reflexive. In contrast , "he committed suicide" 
is an appropriate paraphrase of "he killed himself 
(intentionally) ," no longer is grammatically reflexive 
without difference in the understanding that someone did 
something to him or herself that can also be done to others. 
A slight modification of this assertion shows how misleading 
grammatical definition of reflexivity can be. When "they 
kill themselves" is said about gang members in a city , one 
does not imply that each commits suicide rather that each 
killer is killed by someone else which has no reflexive 
meaning at all. 
Thus , to uncover reflexivity in discourse , it probably 
is advisable to move from the surface structure of 
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grammatical expressions to the deep structure of the 
underlying cognitions. 
c。anitive Reflexivity. As a cognitive phenomenon , 1 am 
suggesting to identify reflexivity by its underlying 
circularity: 
(1) There always seems to be an actor doing something to him 
。r herself , a sentence pointing to itself , a proposition 
containin당 its own (in)validity , a knower thinking about 
what he or she knows or does not know , etc. A reflexive 
relationship is circular. Graphically: 
Actor 
=Target 
Acting 
Sentence 
=Content 
Referring 
Pr6position 
=Evidence 
Validating 
• ~ , , , 
(2) While the paradoxical nature of reflexivity can be 
unsettling and disturb other cognitions , (consider how 
debilitating the command "disobey this command ," can be) , 
its origin can be isolated for it is confined to its 
inherent circularity. Reflexivity is its own cause. 
(3) The reflexive relationship and its arguments change 
x 
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their meaning recursively and adjust them relative to each 
。ther. For example , someone who is self-employed may have 
thought himself to be an employer who hired himself as an 
employee , but as an employee he must be obedient to himself 
as a boss , etc. He maybe telling himself what to do then 
doing it and finally reporting on it in return , talking in 
alternatin연 roles throughout. 80 , a self-employed person 
could be said to be both employer and employee , but , because 
he can not fire the employee without ceasing to be his boss , 
he can not demand a payraise and yield to this demand , etc. , 
he could also be said to be neither employer nor employee. 
The reflexive use of the relation "is employed by" changes 
from its conventional meaning to somethin앙 that recursively 
accommodates the selves involved which in turn become 
defined by the recursive operation of (self-)employment. A 
reflexive relation is constitutive of its own meaning. 
with this in mind , let me now suggest three basic ways 
。f handling reflexivity: 
Self-reflexivitv 
self-reflexivity 
meta-cognition and 
recursive co-construction 
8elf-reflexivity has many faces. I am suggesting that 
all boil down to something that is (or fails to be) what it 
stands for , something that gives evidence for (or 
contradicts) what it purports or something that does (or 
fails to do) what it claims to accomplish. An assertion 
(message , portion of a text or communication) is self-
reflexive not because of its logical or 연rammatical 
(objective) structure but because someone perceives it t。
simultaneously convey two related levels of discourse , one 
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contains and the other is contained therein , one points and 
the other is pointed to , one demonstrates what the other 
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claims , etc. It is quite possible that someone finds n。
problem with the notion of someone deceiving himself , with a 
sign saying "don ’ t read this ," or with the statement "I 
never say never". 80 , observation and cognition is 
implicated in the phenomenon of self-reflexivity but does 
not enter it as a constituent. Let me give just three for 
discourse analysts perhaps familiar examples and then move 
to meta cognition and communication. 
The most common but perhaps also unjustifiably 
generalized example of self-reflexivity is âelf-reference. 
A self-referential assertion refers to (or asserts something 
about) itself. 
"This is an En당lish sentence" 
simultaneously is an English sentence (as every speaker of 
English recognizes) and asserts that it is. Because of the 
coherence of the two levels it is unproblematic (and 
actually totally redundant , semantically). 
’'This is not an English sentence" 
is self-contradictory for it is what it denies it is and a 
reader needs to take sides. 
"This statement is false" 
entails a paradox for if one accepts the statement as true 
。ne is led to consider it false and if one accepts it as 
false one is led to consider it true which closes the 
"vicious circle" in which one finds oneself trapped to g。
around endlessly. 
The inability to cope with self-reference as a 
cognitive phenomenon is longstanding and widespread in our 
scientific culture. Bertrand Russel ’ s Theory of Logical 
Types converted this inability into an unwillingness by 
exorcising the phenomenon from logical-scientific discourse. 
Indebted to some kind of container metaphor of meaning (a 
set cannot contain itself as element) , Russel ’ s theory sees 
statements as pointing to , referring to or containing what 
they are about but only across logical levels and in one 
direction. Surprisingly , Gregory Bateson (1972) explicitly 
relied on Russel ’ s injunction by carefully separating 
c。αnmunication and meta-communication , content levels and 
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relationship levels of messages , etc. , even so Godel ’ s proof 
provided the first threat to the Theory of Logical Types and 
Spencer Brown and Francisco Varela even offered solutions t。
the vicious paradoxes Russel hoped to circumvent. 
Evidence of the widespread inabi1ity to cope with 
problems of self-reflexivity may also be seen in my second 
example. Since J.L. Austin ’ s work (1962) , we are familiar 
with so-called performatives. Performatives are statements 
the very assertion of which makes them true. "I pronounce 
you married ," said by a priest to two people in front of him 
changes their status from single to married. "This is an 
insult ," said in response to someone else , makes whatever 
the other said into an insult from which all other 
interactions "naturally" follow. "You are hereby appointed 
jUdge," "I think you are a nice guy ," "흐흐E르E후드 X르흐프트흐 is a 
blasphemy" exemplify statements that carry their own truth 
with them. They may claim to describe something outside 
themselves but this is unimportant in view of the (intended) 
fact that they make things happen. They are not primarily 
about , ξ뇨트Y. 2。nstitute ζ르효L후iY.， a reality that others must 
live with after the statement has been made. 
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To constitute is to define from within and t。
constitute something is to make something consistent with 
how one choses to talk about it. The film we saw is full of 
words and images and a large part of it has the effect of 
trying to constitute what happened. It is our empoverished 
linguistic notions of content and reference , our inability 
to cope with the circularities of self-reflexivity , that 
make us ask questions about whether the interviewees 
described their reality accurately and , in the face of 
。bvious contradictions , who was right and who was wrong. 
Questions like this seem to manifest an epistemological 
trap. 
My third example is âelf-applicabilitv and I take it 
from the practice of communication research. I think it is 
fair to say that the mainstream of communication research is 
dominated by naturalist traditions. In this tradition , 
scientists seek to discover theory in the empirical evidence 
available or found (whose validity is taken for granted and 
thus constitutionally disowned by their finder) and t。
generalize this theory to other instances of the same kind. 
In communication research , the strict separation of data and 
theory (which may be appropriate in a world , that is 
unaffected by the knowledge about it , such as astronomy) is 
confounded by the fact that the subjects observed to be 
communicating among themselves are not much different from 
the scientists that observe and theorize about them. 
In contrast , 1 am suggesting: everything said is 
communicated to someone , self or other. communication , as 
。bject of communication research , takes place in language 
and largely in the same language in which communication 
theory is constructed and constituted (published and 
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accepted) in communication with others. Thus , communication 
theory is not only about communication but also is 
communication and , because the latter is in the domain of 
the former , communication theory must be applicable t。
itself. Accordingly , a communication theory whose delivery 
(communication to others) contradicts its claim is self-
invalidating and ought to be rejected. A theory should 
always include references to its creator and a theory of 
human communication or of discourse if you wish should als。
apply to itself. 
Unfortunately , the naturalist belief in the strict 
separation of theory and data has its corollary in the 
belief that scientists are superior and neither accountable 
for their theories to the subjects they claim to describe 
not required to demonstrate their applicability to their own 
practice. It is thus not uncommon that communication 
researchers carefully construct their argument for and 
emotionally defend a mathematical theory of cognition that 
allows the subjects neither to construct their own world nor 
to emotionally engage in it. 
Ruling out self-reflexivity even in discourse about 
communication creates a schizophrenic world. 
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The self-reference of assertions , the constitutivity of 
performatives and the self-applicability of theories are 
three examples of self-reflexivity that abstract the knower 
。ut of their circularity. Let me now turn to meta-cognition 
in which the cognition of a knower is a constitutive part of 
the phenomenon observed. 
Meta-coonition in Interoersonal oerceotion 
Much of meta-cognition is indebted to a mirror 
metaphor. Its use in describing human perception goes back 
to Plato and is deeply implanted in folk models of mind as 
reflective of something real. This is deceptive. While a 
mirror image resembles what one knows through direct 
。bservation ， one can never know what direct observations 
really are other than what one sees. Nevertheless , a mirror 
is the only device through which one can see oneself and by 
metaphorical extension can learn who one is. The 
understanding of individual selves as mirrored through 
interaction with significant others also is a cornerstone of 
many social and psychoanalytic theories (Young-Eisendrath 
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and Hall , 1987) , self-awareness being the reflection of the 
self as reflected in others with the possibility of an 
infinite regress in levels of cognition , hence meta-
cognition. 
Suppose , in the beginning of a couple therapy , a 
therapist asks his clients to introduce themselves by 
introducing their partners and thereafter comment on how 
each had been so represented. The procedure tabs the 
knowledge each has of the other and , once revealed , it 
becomes each partner ’ s knowledge about the other ’ s knowledge 
about him or herse1f , a meta-cognition distributed in the 
zig-zag of mutual awareness. 
Laing , Phillipson and Lee (1966) who pioneered what 
they called an Interpersonal perception Method (IPM) studied 
the social implications of the interpersonal reflexivities 
involved. They ask partners three levels of questions , 
exemplified by the list of questions asked of the husband: 
(Direct perspective) 
A. How true do you think the following are? 
1. She loves me 
2. I love her 
3. She loves herself 
4. I love myself 
(Meta-perspective) 
B. How cou1d she answer the following? 
1. "I love him" 
2. "He loves me" 
3. "I love myself" 
4. "He loves himself" 
(Meta-meta-perspective) 
c. How would she think you have answered the following? 
1. She loves me 
2. I love her 
3. She loves herself 
4. I love myself (Laing et al. 1966:57) 
defined four concepts , based on comparisons among answers 
。btained from them , a11 related to the empathy each had t。
the other. These were defined as follows: 
Agr르트꾀ent and gisaqreemen~ arises in comparison between 
。ne partner ’ s direct perspective and the other partners 
direct perspective on the same issue. 
Understandin。 and misunderstanding arises in comparison 
between one person ’ s meta-perspective and the other 
person ’ s direct perspective on the same issue. 
The feeling of 뇨르후ngyndersto。d or of 뇨g후ng 
Inisundersto。g arises in comparison between one person ’ s 
meta-meta-perspective and his or her own direct 
perspective on the same issue. 
The realizati。n or failure of realizatior1 of 
understandinq or misunderstandin。 arises in comparison 
between one person ’ s meta-meta-perspective and the 
。ther person ’ s meta-perspective on the same issue and 
entails comparisons on all three levels. (Laing et al , 
1966:62) 
The IPM was reported as having reliably discriminated 
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between "disturbed couples" and " non-disturbed couples ," the 
former by having fewer instances of agreement , understanding 
and realization of understanding than the latter. The 
number of studies using the IPM is few but growing (Antaki 
and Lewis , 1986). A recent study on intra marital fights 
suggests that couples that are unable to empathize with the 
。thers ’ view on an issue or inadequately assess what the 
。ther thinks easily get into "destructive fights" while 
"helpful fights" are marked by mutually compatible meta 
cognitions (Goleman , 1989). 
According to Miell and Miell (1986) Laing et al. ’ s work 
has been criticized (a) as being limited to only three 
levels of cognition , "direct-" , "meta-" and "meta-meta-
perspectives." The genera11y supported conc1usion that 
subjects can think on1y very few 1eve1s at the same time and 
get easily lost in apparent1y meaningless abstractions when 
asked to imagine responses might an artifact of (b) the 
exc1usive re1iance on 1inguistic responses to a structured 
instrument , exc1uding any interaction with the other. 
The film we saw is a journalist's story of the 
interviewees story which includes the stories of other 
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uninterviewed participants and apparent1y presents n。
difficu1ty in understanding. I consider such meta-meta-meta 
cognitions quite normal and expect it to be present in 
。rdinary conversations as we11. 
Recursive co-construction 
A viab1e a1ternative to the logical level conception in 
meta cognition regards knowledge not as a static 
representation (reflection) of something else but as a 
continual process of making sense of and of creating new 
experiences simu1taneously , of manipulating and at the same 
time constructing symbo1s for manipulation or , as Heinz von 
Foerster put it , as the computation of computation (1981). 
This recursive a1ternative to meta-cognition is we11 
established throu당h G. Spencer Brown (1979) and Francisc。
Varela ’ s (1975) solutions to paradoxes of self-reference , 
both of which describe the unsettling alternatives of a 
paradox as a characteristic sequence of events and thus 
invented a new form in which reflexive paradoxes have a 
natural home. 
In applying recursive notions to cognition , one may 
follow von Foerster ’ s (1961) argument which starts with the 
suggestion that "the logic (of the world) is the logic of 
discriptions ," putting "of the world" in parenthesis , and 
continues by definition (paraphrased here): 
perception = the computation of descriptions 
cognition1 = the computation of perceptions 
cognition2 = the computation of cognition1 
etc. 
and by serial substitution: 
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cognition = the computation of computation of ..• descriptions 
which , when long enough pursued , will render the origins of 
the process insignificant , hence: 
c。gniti。n = the c。mpuiation of기 
8imilarly , seeking to understand the reflexive nature 
。f a self recursively , one would probably have little 
difficulty starting out with the proposition that a 
conscious self is a construction that'arises in interaction 
between the self and other persons. 80 , taking "observe" t。
be the operation embodied in an observer. One could write 
(Krippendorff 1989): 
self-construct1 = observe(self + other) 
self-construct2 = observe(self-construct1 + other construct1 ) 
= observe(observe(self+other)+observe(other+self)) 
etc. 
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in which each can be seen as recursively observing or 
computing their own constructions including the construction 
。f others in them , thus co-constructing each other. In 
finite form , this double recursion can be depicted as: 
「。bserve(s뜸+JTas)a십asφ」 
Before applying this recursive notion to conversation , 
let me point out that Laing et al. developed their IPM as 캉 
research tool to be applied to a sample of married couples 
excluding the researcher. Each subject responded in words 
to the researcher ’ s structured questionnaire and 
independently of the significant others to which they were 
asked to refer. Against the relational backdrop that each 
subject brought to the research situation , the relationships 
。f agreement , understanding , etc. were constructed by the 
analyst , from outside of these couples ’ understanding and 
without these partners present to check on their validity. 
Clearly , Lain당 et al ’ s situation is not much different 
from us viewing the film of two sets of interviewees , each 
telling their own stories. As outsiders , we can do nothing 
but to compare their accounts , to find agreements or 
disagreements among them and to draw certain conclusions. 
The common fact is nobody can ever know what "really" 
happened. Each constructs and reconstructs coherent 
accounts of what they individually experienced including wh。
the other was and , since there was little communication 
among the contending sides as evident in the film , neither 
included much if any of the others story into their own. We 
as viewers are now merely responding in our own terms. 
To put the scientific observer into the very process 
inquiry , I am suggesting that this requires 
(i) Taking responsibility (self-reference). 
(ii) Providing for participation in the phenomenon being 
。bserved ， i.e. , allowing the object of description to be 
constituted by its own description and transformed in the 
process of describing it (constitutivity). 
(iii) Relativizing the process of observation , i.e. , 
applying the very categories for describing others to the 
。bserving self as well , specifically , by not denying others 
the cognitive capabilities observers claim in constructing 
them (self-applicability). 
(iv) SeeJζing recursive accounts for the history of the 
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process of (linguistic) exchanges (discourse) , specifically 
allowing for the self-embedding of own and other ’ s knowledge 
in accounting for the unfolding phenomena. (Recursive 
solution to the problem of logical typing). 
The task is nothing smaller than the development of a 
recursive theory of communication or a conversational theory 
。f co-constructing reality. 
17 
Let me be a bit more formal here and take tw。
individuals A and B and an J.ssue x t。 start 。ut with. It J. s 
fair t。 say that 。ommunication J.s not like bouncing ping-
pong balls back and fourth: 
A: 
/\ /\ /「\
B: 
/ 、/ \/ 
even s。 I have seen ser J. ous researchers describing it that 
way. 
More frequently J.s the notion that A has knowledge 。f x 
and "messages X" t。 B wh。 then knows x as well. Considering 
several unevenly distributed topics V, W, X, Y, and Z , a 
conversation could be conceived 。f like this: 
A: 했) 학헨 (V혔X 
B: (W , Y) “ (싸 (V ，W 、)
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Here knowledge J.s seen as 。bjects 。f sorts that are copied , 
shipped J.n some kind 。f container and reproduced at the 
rece J.v J.ng end. Thus , each communicator acqu J.res the 
knowledge another possesses and the process converges toward 
a state 。f sharing what initially was distributed. I d。
think this ridiculously simplistic conception 。f
communication underlies the frequent use 。f the word 
"sharing" J.n every-day discourse and among communication 
scholars as well. 
In its most basic form , discourse analysis recognizes 
that assertions are not what they appear t。 be and need t。
be interpreted , thus applying a transformation , say I for 
interpretation ’ 。n them. The approach is correct in 
J.gnorJ.ng , what cannot be ascertained anyway , the conceptions 
held by senders and rece J.vers J.n favor 。f the text both 
generate 
depicted 
A: 
B: ? 
The 
J.n the process. This non-recurs J.ve process may be 
like 
task 
this: 
/\ /\ /\ 
\/ \/ 
。f interpreting the vietnam stories we have 
seen , conforms t。 this approach and , putting the narrative 
in 。rder ， interpreting their differences J.n light 。f what we 
‘’ 
know of human nature , probab1y is a11 one can do , given that 
the ana1yst can no longer participate in shaping the 
discourse. (Here , we do not know much about the interviewing 
situation , editing , etc. either). Two things are worth 
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noting here. First , participants always engage in their own 
punctuation of the sequence (Watzlawick , et al. 1967). 
Where one message stops and another starts , how long a 
conversation stays with the same topic , who responds t。
what , etc. is arbitrary in principle for outsiders though 
not inconsequential for participants. Second , an 
interpretation of something is recognizably different from 
what this something is , but to talk about interpretation 
requires knowledge of what is being interpreted. To me this 
is a difficult if not impossible notion. Some discourse 
analyst , hermeneuticians and not to forget literary scholars 
seem to be blind to this epistemological problem by 
theorizing in this linear manner (without recursion). 
Suppose a conversation is not a sequential but a 
recursive process in which each assertion exchanged is a 
response to , comment on or about a previous one. Using the 
two letters A and B now to indicate operations on (or 
interpretations of) an issue X, which are respectively 
embodied in the two conversationalists , and , assuming , 
highly unrealistic as it were , that neither is 
misinterpreting the other and , even more unrealistically , 
that scientists can play the all-knowing , equally objective 
。bserver ， we could see the following dance unfolding: 
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A: ABX ABAX ABABX 
/ 
\ 
、
/ 
B: BAX BABX BABAX 
Let me now take the scientific observer , that is 
myself , to be a participant of the conversation and in the 
position of individual A, who might be clear as to what he 
。r she stands for , knows or says but can no longer presume 
to know who B actually is , what B means to say or how B is 
interpreting what A had been saying. MoreoVer , putting 
parentheses around what A sees him or herself as receiving 
from B or from elsewhere , leaving outside these parentheses 
A ’ s constructions that place what is seen in the context of 
his or her own past experiences. 
工. e. 
ABAB ... A(BAB ... X) 
‘--‘~'---、，..-..J/ 、/’ 、、
/’ 、/ 、
context constructed for what is observed 
Assuming further that A keeps track of the for him or her 
"proper" punctuation and history , one can now depict the 
recursive process the way it might appear to a reflexively 
aware participant observer , here A, with all of its growing 
number of observable alternatives: 
~ABABX-­
~ ABAX - ABA(BX) 
一_ ABX ~ ABA(X) ABA(BX) 
__ AX - AB(X) AB(AX) AB(ABX) 
21 
ABABA(BA ... ) 
ABAB(AB ... ) 
ABA(BA. . . ) 
AB(AB... ) 
A: X-- • _A(X) .. A(BX) .. A(BAX) __ A(BABX)_ __ A(BA... ) 
B: ? ? ? ? ? 
Here , whether A interprets B as sayin연 (BAX) 
[B says how B interprets what A said about X] , B(AX) 
[B says what A said about X] or BA(X) [B said X] , 
for example , A has no choice but to rely on the history of 
the process to reconstruct the context of his or her 
。bservations ， thus always incorporating new experiences int。
the past knowledge of him or herself and the other 
conversationalist. In principle , the parellel processes: 
AX X 
ARAX and ABX 
ABABAX ABABX 
can continue 르약 후끄￡후E후후브m at which point they become the 
recursion: 
AB(AB) 
Thus conceived , conversations recursively generate 
their own braided history. There are no levels , only the 
self-generated record of a process that ultimately closes on 
itself. Conversational practice may not be so "neat," 
however. After a short while , what is being said may n。
lon연er carry the burden of the whole past into the future. 
Conversationalists respond selectively and contextualize 
selectively. New topics may enter and supersede old ones , 
but , whenever one is perceived as responding to a previous 
。ne ， recursive sense is made of the connection. with such 
connections constructed , conversations always appear 
coherent even when they do not exhaust the recursive depth 
possible. 
Let me now consider three issues concerning 
understanding and consensus , which , 1 believe , enter all 
discourses and their participatory analysis in one form or 
another. 
Laing et al. have shown consensus not to be a simple 
matter. There are different kinds and each requires 
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c。moarisong on different levels , or in the recursive account 
proposed here , at different points in the history of a 
conversation and within the constructions any one 
participant employs. 1 will not repeat Laing et al. ’ s 
definitions here but include them in the table below , using 
the formalism so far developed. They serve as a kind of 
window that one can think of sliding over the whole history 
if one seeks to test for any kind of consensus. For 
example , an assessment of agreement or disagreement requires 
comparisons between simple assertions , for example , what A 
believes or knows about X and what A heard B as saying about 
X. Realization of understanding requires more complex 
comparisons that involve a longer history. Whether there 
are even more complex forms of understanding I do not know. 
I am convinced though , that consensus does not constitute a 
"flat"domain. 
A(뿜) 
AX 
A (dis)agrees 
with B on X 
A 
ABX 
-
(mis)understands s 
B on X 
ABAX 
-
A (dis)agrees 
to (dis)agree 
with B on X 
A (fails to) 
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A(BAX) 
A feels being 
(mis)understood 
by B on X 
A (fails to) 
realise(s) 
(dis)agreement on 
each other ’ s 
view on X 
realize(s) B’ s 
(mis)understanding 
。 f A δhX 
The table depicts ways of obtaining consensus by 
comparison. In ordinary conversations a second issue arises 
with assertions like "I agree ," I understand you ," "I feel 
being understood" etc. Such assertions give evidence of the 
participant ’ s ability to make such comparisons and their 
expression to each other has !neta-constructive meanin。s. For 
example , if A has asserted X and B expresses agreement 
explicitly , A can construct B as having made the comparison 
between (AX) and BX and found them matching. Even so A may 
never know exactly what B had compared , for example , there 
could be hidden disagreements in punctuation or unexpected 
interpretations , the assertion of agreement is a suggestion 
to move on. Or when B asserts bein연 misunderstood by A, A 
can construct B as unable to reconcile the difference 
between what A said about B's view on X and what B really 
feels about it. The assertion of misunderstanding suggests 
to backtrack and reiterate where that difference seemingly 
arose. Assertions of (dis)agreement and (mis)understanding 
may never be specific about what is being compared but give 
evidence of higher-level constructions at work which either 
participant needs to incorporate in his or her own 
construction of the other. 
The third issue concerns 호르으후.t:llnderstandin。 or 
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implicit confirmation. As a constructivist , I assume we 
have no knowledge about a world outside of our own 
constructions. We act and talk in concert with them until 
they get us into unexpected difficulties and are thus 
disconfirmed. The knowledge that all conversations generate 
about other participants always entail expectations about 
how they would respond to ones own assertions and 
dispositions regarding how one is likely to act towards 
them. When A says X and interprets B ’ s response as A(BAX) , 
that is , as his or her assessment of B’ s interpretation on 
what A said , if B’ s response falls within the domain of A’ s 
expectation , is explainable from A ’ s construction of B, then 
A may assume to at least tacitly understand B, but will have 
to modify the construction of B if B ’ s behavior comes t。
appear odd. 
There also is the possibility of conflicts , for 
example , when A hears B as disagreing with what A said while 
conformin연 with how A expects B to respond , or agreeing with 
A while not conforming with A ’ s expectations of B. A is 
then forced to explain the experienced conflicts which means 
finding recursive transformations of his or her observations 
that modify the construction of the other. 
Finally , 1 want to point out that the recursive depth 
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。f discourse , the level of mutual understanding achievable 
within it , always is a matter of cooperation and of 
continuous challenge. It is difficult to construct 
recursive models of a discourse that essentially consists of 
a sequence of unrelated assertions. For mutual 
understanding to become experientially manifest , discourse 
must include several recursions of selves and others. 
situations that make this difficult , like the two parties 
during the war in Vietnam , or when one party is unwilling or 
incapable of reflexive constructions , understanding about 
。thers will remain shallow and unsatisfactory as is well 
known in marital discourse (Goleman , 1989). To exorcise 
reflexivity from social science theory and methodology is 
equally disastrous to human understanding of human beings. 
The fact that our constructions of each other have their own 
lives , are subject to evolutionary transformations , and thus 
constantly undermine any once achieved understanding makes 
the construction of appropriate theories of discourse and 
communication a never ending challen당e. 
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